

Message Text

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P R 081300Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2046
INFO AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 LA PAZ 6309

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, BL, PGOV
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 177481, (C) STATE 182987

THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REF A AS AMENDED BY REFS B AND C.

1. THIS ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA IS WRITTEN AT A TIME WHEN SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOB ARE STILL UNCLEAR. YET THE PEREDA GOV'T'S AUGUST 6 ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS INTENT TO TURN POWER OVER TO AN ELECTED GOV'T WITHIN 24 MONTHS, DETERMINES A MAJOR PART OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH OUR PROGRAMS WILL OPERATE OVER THE NEXT 2 YEARS. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A PROGRAM WHICH WILL PROVIDE US THE FLEXIBILITY TO APPROPRIATELY ANSWER THE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL EVOLVE BETWEEN NOW AND THE PLANNING PERIOD (FY80-82). SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS HAD A

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POSITIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOB AND HAS ENHANCED OUR ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY PURSUE US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, INPARTICULAR RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY 'S CIVIC ACTION ROLE. IF APPROPRIATELY FUNDED AND MANAGED, THE PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO PROIVDE USEFUL CONDUITS TO THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS AND TO OFFER THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE A PRO-U.S. ORIENTATION AMONG THE JUNIOR AND FUTURE

LEADERS OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES (ESPECIALLY THROUGH IMET TRAINING). THE PROGRAM LEVELS PROPOSED HEREIN ARE MODEST. THEY REFLECT OUR LONGSTANDING CLOSE TIES WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT INSTITUTION WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOLIVIA. FY 80 SECURITY ASSISTANCE EFFORT SHOULD INCREASE TO EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY'S DECISION TO TURN POWER OVER TO AN ELECTED GOV'T IN THE COURSE OF FY80.

2. US INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES

A. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY SUPPORTIVE OF USG INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE ANDEAN REGION. FURTHER, THE PROGRAM PROMOTES TIES BETWEEN THE USG AND THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY CONDUCIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE INTERCHANGE OF VIEWS AND EXERCISE OF US INFLUENCE IN ORDER TO PROMOTE IMPORTANT USG INTERESTS SUCH AS THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONCTROL, AND MAINTENANCE OF A MINIMAL LEVEL OF TENSION AMONG THE ANDEAN COUTRIES. ADDITIONALLY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMPLEMENTS OTHER USG PROGRAMS AIMED AT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CONDITIONS PERMITTING US ACCESS TO STRATEGIC NATIONAL RESOURCES AND THE MARKETING OF US PRODUCTS.

B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOCUS ON THE MAINTENANCE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY SO AS TO (1) ENCOURAGE CONTINUATION OF GOB POLICY OF
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RESTRAINING ARMS PRUCHASES, (2) SUGGEST CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON NATION BUILDING AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS OF THE ARMED FORCES RATHER THAN HEAVY ARMS PRUCHASES AND (3) CONVENY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE USG ATTACHES TO DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST REMAIN RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR REASONABLE MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASES AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE CZ AND CONUS TRAINING A EFFECTIVE LEVELS TO PERSONNEL OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES.

3. THE EXTERNAL THREAT: THE LEGACY OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC IS THE CURRENT UNEASINESS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE. WHILE THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY WITNESS WITH GLEE A WAR BETWEEN ITS NEIGHBORS, CHILE AND PERU, THE MATTER IS NOT SO SIMPLE, AND BOLIVIA'S OFFICERS BELIEVE THEY CANNOT HELP BUT BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN BETWEEN TACNA, PERU AND ARICA, CHILE (THE OBVIOUS PERUVIAN REVANCHIST OBJECTIVE) IS SUCH, ARGUE BOLIVIANS, THAT PERU WILL HAVE TO SWING THROUGH THE BOLIVIAN ALTIPLANO IN AN ENVELOPING MANEUVER SOUTH OF ARICA, SUPPORTED BY ATTACH DOWN THE COAST, AS WELL AS NAVAL OPERATIONS. HAVING LOST LARGE AMOUNTS OF TERRITORY IN WARS WITH HER NEIGHBORS, BOLIVIA PERCEIVES THE THREAT IN THE ALTIPLANO AS VERY REAL. BECUASE BOLIVIAN OFFICERS REALIZE THEIR

EXTREME WEAKNESS VIZ-A-VIZ PERU AND CHILE, THEY SEE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF EITHER BELLIGERENT FOR VIOLATING SOVEREIGN BOLIVIAN TERRITORY AS THEIR GREATEST HOPE OF SURVIVING INTACT AFTER THE SMOKE CLEARS. THIS CONCERN OVER THE PROBABILITY OF A PERU-CHILE WAR WAS, ACCORDING TO USDAO SOURCES, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THEN-PRESIDENT BANZER TO MOVE ELECTIONS UP FROM THE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED 1980 TO JULY 1978. BANZER REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF GAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ITS NEUTRALITY THAN WOULD A DE FACTO MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

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4. US EMBASSY VIEW ON EFFICACY OF BOLIVIAN CONCERNS: THE EXTREMELY DELICATE FINANCIAL SITUATION IN PERU WOULD SEEM TO LIMIT THAT NATION'S ABILITY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES. WE THUS SEE AS UNLIKELY A PERUVIAN ATTACK ON CHILE, OR VICE VERSA, DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

INTERNAL THREAT: THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT NORMALLY VIEWS THE MINERS AND THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AS THE PRINCIPAL THREATS TO INTERNAL STABILITY, EVEN IN THE BEST OF TIMES. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANNULLED ELECTIONS AND THE SEIZING OF POWER BY GOVERNMENT CANDIDATE JUAN PEREDA, THE CONCERN WILL PROBABLY INTENSIFY AND WITH REASON. WITH THE UNLIMITED AMNESTY OF JANUARY 1978, MANY PEOPLE WITH A RECORD OF POLITICAL INTRIGUE AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT INCLINATION RETURNED TO BOLIVIA. ONE OF

THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE PEREDA GOVT'S NEW DEMOCRATIZATION PLAN IS TO GAIN THE PEACEFUL SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN THE COMPLETION OF THIS PROCESS DURING THE PEREDA ADMINISTRATION. THE SUCCESS OF THIS TACTIC HAS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED.

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5. HOST COUNTRY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: AS STATED IN PARA 3, ABOVE, THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH ITS WOEFUL INABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE EXTERNAL THREAT POSED BY A CHILE-PERU CONFRONTATION. HOWEVER, RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE AND TRAIN A FORCE CAPABLE OF MEETING THE EXTERNAL THREAT, GOV HAS OPTED TO FOCUS ITS LIMITED RESOURCES ON COUNTERING THE INTERNAL THREAT AND ON NATION BUILDING AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. THE ARMY, WHILE OBVIOUSLY DESIROUS OF ACQUIRING MODERN ARMS (ESPECIALLY ARTILLERY, ANTITANK WEAPONS, AND ARMORED VEHICLES), HAS CONTENTED ITSELF WITH INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIC ACTION. THE AIR FORCE HAS TAKEN SOME ACTION TO MODERNIZE ITS INVENTORY, BUT HAS CHOSEN TO PURCHASE AIRCRAFT MORE SUITED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING THAN TO COMBAT MISSIONS AGAINST MODERN ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES. LIKEWISE, THE BOLIVIAN NAVY HAS DIRECTED ITS EFFORTS TOWARD INTERNAL DEFENSE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES ALONG THE EASTERN AND NORTHEASTERN RIVER SYSTEM.

6. ASSESSMENT OF HOST COUNTRY FORCES:

A. THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES, AS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED, COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE COUNTRY AGAINST ANY NEIGHBOR STATE, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PARAGUAY. SIMILARLY, THEY DONOT PRESENT AN OFFENSIVE THREAT TO ANY NEIGHBOR. ASSUMING UNITY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND SHORT OF THE INTERVENTION OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS, THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE, SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF COPING WITH THE INTERNAL THREAT.

B. THE CURRENT FORCE CAPABILITY OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES IS SUPPORTIVE OF US INTERESTS. THE FORCE DOES NOT CONSITITUE A THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS, PLUS THE RESTRAINT WHICH THE GOB

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HAS SHOWN TOWARD ARMS PURCHASES, IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR DESIRE FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND ARMS CONTROL. THE ARMED FORCES ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE INTERNAL SECURITY, TOGETHER WITH THE EMPHASIS THE MILITARY HAS PLACED ON NATIONBUILDING PROGRAMS, CAN PROVIDE THE STABILITY REQUIRED FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

DEVELOPMENT.

7. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND IMPACT ON ECONOMY:

DEFENSE SPENDING IN BOLIVIA HAS BEEN HELD TO A LOW LEVEL. FURTHER, A LARGE PART OF THE EXPENDITURES DEFINED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES HAS BEEN USED FOR THE PURCHASE OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND FOR ROAD BUILDING EQUIPMENT SUPPORTIVE OF NATION BUILDING EFFORTS. THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (\$83.7 MILLION) IS ONLY 3 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET AND 2 PERCENT OF GDP (\$4.32 BILLION CURRENT DOLLARS, 1978 ESTIMATE). THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET DOES NOT INCLUDE THE BUDGETS OF THE GEODETIC SURVEY, THE ENGINEER COMMAND, THE HYDROGRAPHIC SERVICE, COFADENA (DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE ARMED FORCES) OR COSSMIL (MILITARY SOCIAL SECURITY). THE 1978 INVESTMENT BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS ONLY 1 PERCENT OF THE INVESTMENT BUDGET OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (\$800 MILLION). MILITARY IMPORT DATA FOR 1977 ARE NOT AVAILABLE, BUT WHEN AVAILABLE FIGURES WILL REFLECT EXPENDITURES FOR TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SUCH AS C-130 AIRCRAFT AND ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT; MILITARY IMPORTS WILL BE A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS (644 MILLION DOLLARS IN 1977). BOLIVIA IS THE POOREST COUNTRY IN SOUTH AMERICA, BUT IT EXPERIENCED GOOD ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FROM 1973 TO 1977. HOWEVER, IN 1978 THE ECONOMY IS FACING A DIFFICULT CONJUNCTURE OF EVENTS. A RELATIVELY LARGE FOREIGN DEBT (\$2.5 BILLION) IS CONTRIBUTING TO A GROWING DEBT SERVICE RATION 1978 ESTIMATE IS 25 PERCENT). AS INTEREST AND AMORTIZATION PAYMENTS ARE INCREASING, EXPORTS ARE DROPPING OFF BECAUSE OF DECLINING TIN AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTION. THE NET DEFICIT OF THE 1978 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IS ESTIMATED AT \$93 TO \$213 MILLION (SEE LA PAZ 5383). ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 1978 WILL BE LESS THAN IN ANY OF THE PREVIOUS SIX

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YEARS. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY HAS ADDED TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY LOWERING INVESTMENT AND INCREASING SHORT TERM CAPITAL FLIGHT

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8. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT

THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES MAY SEEK TO ACQUIRE FROM THE US IN FY 80-82 WILL NOT HAVE ANY DISSTABILIZING EFFECT, NOR WILL IT RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW CAPABILITIES IN THE REGION. THE C-130 AIRCRAFT, LIGHT UTILITY AIRCRAFT AND UTILITY HELICOPTERS ARE PRINCIPALLY USED IN NON-MILITARY ROLES IN SUPPORT OF THE NATION BUILDING PROGRAM OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES. THE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (TRUCKS AND BULLDOZERS) WILL ALSO BE USED IN ANTION BUILDING PROGRAMS AND WILL COMPLEMENT THE EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED IN PREVIOUS YEARS THROUGH MAP, FMS CREDITS, AND COMMERCIAL PURCHASES. THE BOLIVIAN AMRY HAS SOUGHT TO ACQUIRE TANKS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES FROM THE US IN PREVIOUS YEARS WITHOUT SUCCESS FOR A VERIETY OF REASONS, E.G., LACK OF FUNDS, HIGH COST, LONG LEAD TIMES AND REFUSAL BY THE USG TO RELEASE SUCH EQUIPMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE BOLIVIAN ARMY CONTINUES TO SHOW INTEREST IN THE ACQUISITION OF
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SUCH EQUIPMENT. THE ACQUISITION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT WILL NOT ALTER REGIONAL STABILITY WHEN COMPARED WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES OF PERU AND CHILE.

9. HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT

AT THE PRESENT TIME THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BOLIVIA IS QUITE GOOD IN TWO AREAS. THE FIRST AREA DEALS WITH RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON. SINCE THE EMBASSY'S LAST EXTENSIVE TREATMENT OF THIS SUBJECT (SEE LA PAZ 0694 AND 77 LA PAZ 9549) THE GENERAL SITUATION HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE. THERE WERE NO KNOWN POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS PRIOR TO THE JULY 9 ELECTIONS AND, ALTHOUGH SINCE THE ELECTIONS THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW ARREST, IN GENERAL THE PERSONS ARRESTED HAVE

BEEN HELD FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS AND THEN RELEASED. MOREOVER, THERE HAVE BEEN NO ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OR OTHER INHUMAN TREATMENT.

IN THE SECOND AREA, THAT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO BASIC HUMAN NEEDS, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE SITUATION REPORTED REFTELS.

THE THIRD MAJOR AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO LEAD TO REPLACEMENT OF THE DE FACTO MILITARY GOVERNMENT BY AN ELECTED VIBILSN HOBRTNMRNY RNFRF IN A MILITARY COUP D' ETAT AND ANOTHER DE FACTO MILITARY GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES TO OPERATE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND OF THE TRADE UNIONS TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, THE PEREDA ADMINISTRATION HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A PROCESS THAT IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO NEW NATIONAL ELECTIONS BY AUGUST OF 1980.

THE MISSION BELIEVES THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AT APPROXIMATELY THE PRESENT LEVEL WOULD SERVE THE INTEREST OF PROMOTING US HUMAN RIGHTS
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OBJECTIVES. FOR, ALTHOUGH THH SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ITSELF HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROGRAM GIVES US MILITARY OFFICERS AND THE AMBASSADOR ACCESS TO THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY AND THEREBY PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THEM TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTING US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. US MILITARY INFLUENCE, WHEN ADDED TO ALLOTHER FORCES TENDING TO MOVE THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TOWARDS IMPROVING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, CAN HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AMERICAN INFLUENCE WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY EXERCISED THROUGH THE DAO AND THE MILGP PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HELPING TO PREVENT THE ABORTION OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1978. ALTHOUGH THE PROCESS DID IN THE END ABORT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT US INFLUENCE DID NOT PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE, ONLY THAT IN THE END THIS INFLUENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OFFSET VERY STRONG COUNTER-PRESSURES. NOW THAT THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS HAS BEEN RESTARTED IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TO SEE TO IT THAT THIS TIME THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS DOES NOT ABORT.

10. USAID AND OTHER DONOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

A. THE USAID PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA IS CONCENTRATED IN THREE SECTORS: AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION AND HEALTH WITH EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE RURAL POOR. THE PROGRAM ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO OTHER US INTEREST BY SUPPORTING BOLIVIAN EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRODUCTION OF COCA LEAF. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR GOAL AID HAS UNDERWAY LOAN FUNDED PROJECTS TOTALLING \$116,3 MILLION AND GRANT FUNDED PROJECTS TOTALLING THUS FAR

\$11.6 MILLION. THE US ASSISTANCE TO THE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT
 TOTALS \$5.9 MILLION. ANNUAL FUNDING LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 (\$ MILLIONS)

	FY 78		FY 79		FY 80	
	FY77	OBLIGATED	PENDING	FY79	FY80	
	ACTUAL TO DATE		OBLIGATIONS	PLANNED	PLANNED	
LOANS	31.5	--	28.3	61.5	50.0	
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GRANTS	3.7	3.3	1.73	13.6	12.2
NARCOTICS					
CONTROL					
(GRANT					
FUNDED)	2.90	1.85	1.20	3.7	3.80
PL480					
TITLE II					
PL480					
TITLE III			12.0	13.2	
HOUSING					
INVESTMENT					
GUARANTIES			16.0		

B. OTHER DONORS

IN SPITE OF THE SHORTCOMINGS IN OUR DATA IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE
 MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER DONORS IN QUITE
 SIGNIFICANT. THE TOTAL CURRENT INVESTMENT IN AREAS WHERE
 USAID ALSO WORKS IS \$695.4 MILLION. THIS INVESTMENT IS CONCENTRATED
 MAINLY IN AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, HEALTH AND TRANSPORTATION.
 THIS FIGURE DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL BILATERAL DONORS; INFORMATION
 ON PROJECTS CONDUCTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF BRAZIL AND ISRAEL,
 AMONG OTHERS, IS NOT YET AVAILABLE. THE ABOVE DATA ON ECONOMIC
 ASSISTANCE IS BASED ON THE VALUE OF ONGOING PROJECTS. THESE
 FIGURES DON NOT INCLUDE OTHER PROJECTS IN AREAS WHICH AID IS NOT
 INVOLVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE IDB HAS FINANCED TWO PETROLEUM
 REFINERIES FOR YPFH HAVING A TOTAL PROJECT COST OF \$138 MILLION.
 THE USSR AND POLAND ALSO EXTEND ASSISTANCE BUT MAINLY TO THE
 MINING SECTOR. CREDITS ARE OFFERED FOR THE PURCHASE OF MINING
 MACHINERY AND CONSTRUCTION OF TIN VOLITIZATION PLANTS (USSR).
 THE FIRST SUCH PLANT TO BE COMPLETED IN 1979 IS ESTIMATE TO
 COST ABOUT \$25 MILLION. THE TOTAL VALUE OF ON-GOING SOVIET
 AND EASTERN BLOC ASSISTANCE IS ESTIMATED AT \$60 MILLION
 (MOSTLY TRADE CREDITS WHICH HAVE BEEN OPEN FOR FIVE TO EIGHT
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YEARS). THE SHARES OF CERTAIN SECTORS WOULD INCREASE

IN THE "OTHER" CATEGORY WERE DISAGGREGATED. THE "OTHER" CATEGORY IS ALMOST TOTALLY COMPRISED OF MULTISECTORAL LOANS FOR WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED A BREAKDOWN BY THE DONORS INVOLVED. NOR DO WE CURRENTLY HAVE A LOAN VERUS GRANT ANALYSIS BECAUSE THE PROJECTS ARE OFTEN MIXED.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE \$695.4 MILLION IN KNOWN ACTIVE PROJECT ACCORDING TO DONORS IS AS FOLLOWS:

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DONOR AMOUNT PERCENT
(\$US MILLIONS)

1. ARGENTINA	50.52	7.3
2. AUSTRIA	.11	#
3. BELGIUM	16.15	2.3
4. GREAT BRITAIN (BTAM)	.36	#
5. BRAZIL (CACEX/BANK OF BRASIL)	8.3	1.2
6. CAF	17.2	2.5
7. TAIWAN	.9	#
8. CANADA (CIDA)	12.5	1.8
9. SWITZERLAND (COTESU)	4.0	#
10. DENMARK (DANIDA)	6.8	1.0
11. FINLAND	1.8	#
12. FRANCE	5.7	#
13. GERMANY	46.0	6.6
14. IBRD	173.7	25.0

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15. IDB	114.0	16.4
16. ISRAEL	.04	#
17. ITALY	.13	#
18. NETHERLANDS (NOVIB)	.6	#
19. OAS	.17	#
20. JAPAN (OECF)	12.3	1.8
21. SPAIN	N 1.4	#
22. UN GROUP	36.7	5.3
23. VENEZUELA	4.0	#
24. COMMERCIAL		
INSTITUTIONS ##	182.7	26.3

695.4 97.5

LESS THAN ONE PERCENT

COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS TO PROJECTS IN THE SAME AREAS OF INTEREST IN WHICH AID WORKS (E.G., AGRICULTURE, HEALTH, ETC.)

TOTAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES AND PROJECTS NOT INCLUDED ABOVE (\$695 MILLION) IS ESTIMATE AT OVER \$200 MILLION. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE STATISTICS THAT THE US PLAYS AN IMPORTANT BUT MODEST ROLE IN THE TOTAL ASSISTANCE PICTURE FOR BOLIVIA.

C. FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

THE MAJORITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. SEE DIA PUBLICATION "FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE", DATED MARCH 1978, PAGE IV-13, FOR COMPLETE SUMMARY OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ALL SOURCES. ON ITEM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PUBLICATION IS THE OCEAN-GOING CARGO VESSEL DONATED BY VENEZUELA IN 1977. ALTHOUGH IT IS BEING USED FOR NON-MILITARY CARGO PURPOSES, IT IS BEING CREWED BY THE BOLIVIAN NAVY. ADDITIONALLY, IN JUNE 1978, THE PBOLIVIAN AIR FORCES RECEIVED 6 SIAI-MARCHETTI SF 260 TRAINER AIRCRAFT FROM ITALY.

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11. PROGRAM ASSESSMENT:

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM): IMET-\$360,000; FMSCR \$6,000,00

(1) IMET \$360,000. THIS IS A SHARP REDUCTION FROM THE FY 78 LEVEL AND WOULD CAUSE A MAJOR DECLINE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM TO SUPPORT OUR INTEREST IN BOLIVIA. IT WOULD ELIMINATE ALL CONUS TRAINING AND NECESSITATE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ATTENDING CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. THE PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BASIC COMBAT ARMS TRAINING FOR 160 BOLIVIAN ARMY CADETS AND MINIMAL ATTENDANCE AT BASIC AIRMAN TECHNICAL COURSES (AIR FORCE) AND COMMUNICATIONS AND PATROL BOAT TRAINING (NAVY) IN CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS.

(2) FMS CREDITS-\$6,000,000. IN VIEW OF THE PRECIPITATE REDUCTION IN FMSCR BETWEEN FY 78 (\$14 MILLION) BY FY 79 (\$6

MILLION) AND THE RECNT AND FINAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE ENTIRE FY 78 OFFER, WE BELIVE THAT THIS IS THE MINIMUM LEVEL USEFUL TO OUR EFFORTS. RECOGNIZING THAT WE CANNOT FORESEE GOB REACTION TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FY 78 CREDITS OR INTERIM BUY DECISION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT USE GOB WOULD MAKE OF THESE FUNDS. BASED ON CURRENT INTEREST, WE BELIEVE THAT CREDITS WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE THE PURCHASE OF HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT, AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND SPARE PARTS, OR UTILITY HELICOPTERS. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD STEER ANY PURCHASE TO ESSENTIALLY NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT THROUGH MANIPULATION OF CREDIT TERMS.

B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE): IMET-\$405,000; FMSCR \$6,000,000

(1) IMET-\$405,000. WHILE THIS LEVEL WOULD RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF OVERALL TRAINING, IT WOULD PROVIDE ATTENDANCE AT CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS AS OUTLINED FOR LEVEL 1 AND WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR SOME CONUS PROFESSIONAL LEVEL TRAINING (1-4 STUDENTS DEPENDING UPON THE SELECTED COURSE COSTS).

(2) FMSCR-\$6,000,000: (SAME AS LEVEL 1 ABOVE)

C. LEVEL 3 (CRRENT): IMET-\$450,000; FMSCR-\$6,000,000

(1) IMET-\$450,000. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL, IN VIEW OF EVER RISING

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COURSE COSTS, WILL NECESSITATE A REDUCTION IN STUDENT ATTENDANCE LEVELS AND THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM. HOWEVER, IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR INCREASED ATTENDANCE AT CZ PROFESSIONAL LEVEL COURSES OVER THAT POSSIBLE AT LEVEL 2.

(2) FMSCR-\$6,000,000. (SEE LEVEL 1 ABOVE).

D. LEVEL 4 (INCREMENTAL): IMET-\$575,000; FMSCR-\$14,000,000

(1) IMET-\$575,000. THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING (ASSUMING NO MAJOR INCREASES IN COURSE COSTS) WILL ALLOW US TO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF STUDNETS ATTENDING CONUS TRAINING WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO IMPACT FAVORABLY ON OUR CURRENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO GAIN STATURE AND INFLUENCE WITHIN THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. FURTHER, TI WOULD ALLOW THE PROGRAMMING OF MOBILE TRAINING A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE AND MAINT-ENANCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING IN-COUNTRY.

(2) FMS CREDITS-\$14,000,000. THIS WOULD RESTORE THE PROGRAM TO THE FY 78-79 LEVELS. PURCHASES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE AT LOWER LEVELS THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE A DEGREE OF US INFLUENCE OVER BOLIVIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION PLANS. TI WOULD ALLOW US TO STIMULATE A CONTINUATION OF GOB POLICY TO IMPHASIZE THE NATION-BUILDING BENEFITS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE OVERALL RESULT WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN RELIANCE AND DEPENDENCE ON US EQUIPMENT AND A COMPARABLE DECREASE IN DEPENDENCE ON OTHER SOURCES. PURCHASES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE A LOWER LEVELS. THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE A DEGREE OF US INFLUENCE OVER BOLIVIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT ACQUISTION PLANS. IT WOULD ALLOW US TO STIMULATE A CONTINUATION OF GOB POLICY TO

EMPHASIZE THE NATION-BUILDING BENEFITS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE INCREASE OVER FY79 WOULD ALLOW US TO REWARD THE MILITARY SHOULD THEY, AS NOW APPEARS LIKELY, BE PLANNING TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO A CIVILIAN, ELECTED REGIME DURING FY80. THIS INCREASED LEVEL FOR FY 80 WOULD ESSENTIALLY REPLACE THE SIMILAR LEVEL WE HAD PLANNED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IN FY 78. A SOME-

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WHAT LOWER LEVEL WOULD THEN FOLLOW IN FY 78 AND FY 82. THE OVERALL RESULT WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN RELIANCE AND DEPENDENCE ON US EQUIPMENT AND A COMPARABLE DECREASE IN DEPENDENCE ON OTHER SOURCES. PURCHASES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE AT LOWER LEVELS, WITH THE PROBABLE ADDITION OF ONE C-130 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.

12. RISK ASSESSMENT:

THE FUNDING PROGRAMMED FOR BOLIVIA MUST BE DETERMINED IN CONSONANCE WITH AND IN REACTION TO THE COURSE THE PEREDA GOVERNMENT FOLLOWS WITH REGARD TO DEMOCRATIZATION, POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE OPPOSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE ABOVE NUMBERS WILL BE DEBATED AND THE FIGURES RELEASED IN THE CPD PROVIDE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED TO CONGRESS WILL PROVIDE US AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REACTION TO THOSE DECISIONS. (USG DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN TO ELIMINATE FY 78 FMSCR AND SOME AID PROGRAMS WILL AMPLY DEMONSTRATE OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE EVENTS WHICH BROUGHT PEREDA TO POWER.) THE PROPOSED PROGRAM LEVELS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED PROCEEDING FROM THE CENTRAL ASSUMPTION THAT EVOLVING EVENTS WILL BE SUCH THAT WE DECIDE TO MAINTAIN A MEANINGFUL SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEREDA GOVERNMENT. THIS IS, WE DECIDE THAT WE WISH TO PURSUE OUR INTEREST THROUGH TIMELY AND PROPER USE OF INFLUENCE TO EFFECT EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE OF THE PEREDA GOVERNMENT. DRIVING THE PEREDA GOVERNMENT INTO THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF REPRESSIVE LATIN MILITARY REGIMES OR PROVOKING A RADICAL REVOLUTION WITH PERHAPS EVEN MORE DISTASTEFUL GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE INIMICAL TO US INTEREST. IT FOLLOWS THAT PROGRAM LEVEL DECISIONS MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE CROSSOVER POINT WHERE US INFLUENCE RAPIDLY RECEDES WHILE OTHER COUNTRIES ARE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH A MARGINAL INVESTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. RECOGNIZING THE STEADY DOWNWARD TREND OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA IN RECENT YEARS, WE BELIEVE WE HAVE REACHED OR FAST APPROACHING THAT POINT.

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P R 081300Z AUG 78
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INFO AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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REACHING THIS POINT, WE WOULD GREATLY REDUCE OUR TRADITIONAL ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THIS MAJOR INSTITUTION IN BOLIVIAN SOCIETY. LEVELS 1 AND 2 WOULD DECIDEDLY REDUCE OUR ABILITY TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FUTHER OUR INTERESTS. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS A VALUABLE ASSET HERE, IN BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG RUN. THEREFORE, OUR DILEMMA IS TO CHOOSE A PROGRAM LEVEL FOR THE NEAR FUTURE WHICH DEMONSTRATES OUR VIEW OF PEREDA'S COUP AND HIS GOVERNMENT ACTIONS WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY PREJUDICING OUR LONG TERM OBJECTIVES. THOUGH WE CANNOT GUARANTEE SUCESS WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN BE DONE BY ESTABLISHING A RELATIVELY MODEST LEVEL OF FMS CREDITS (\$6,000,000) AND BY INCREASING IMET FUNDS. TTUS WHILE WE PREFER INCREASE IN BOTH CATEGORIES, ESPECIALLY IMET, AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A PROGRAM WHICH WOULD RAISE IMET TO THE INCREMENTAL (\$575,000) OR HIGHER LEVEL, BUT WHICH WOULD REDUCE FMSCR TO SOME FIGURE BETWEEN THE CURRENT (\$6,000,000) AND INCREMENTAL LEVEL (\$14,000,000). THE FMSCR LEVEL SHOULD INCREASE TO THE FULL \$14,000,000 IN FY 80.

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13.
A. FY 1980 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR BOLIVIA (\$000)

A. LEVELS	IMET	FMS CREDITS	MAP
(1) MINIMUM LEVEL	360	6000	N/A
(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL	405	6000	N/A
(3) CURRENT LEVEL (FY 1979)	450	6000	N/A
(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL	575	14,000	N/A

B. FY 1980 PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS

	US MIL	US CIV	LWR
A. MINIMUM LEVEL	6	2	3
B. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL	6	2	4
C. CURRENT LEVEL	6	2	5
D. INCREMENTAL LEVEL	6	2	5

C. JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. THE CURRENT MANNING LEVEL (6 US MIL, 2 US CIV, 5 LWR) HAS PROVEN TO BE ADEQUATE FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE FAA OF 1977. HENCE, WE HAVE CHOSEN IT AS THE BASE FOR JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. SEVERAL FACTORS, UNIQUE TO OUR ACTIVITIES HERE, HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD AND IMPACT AT EACH PROGRAM AND MANNING LEVEL.

A. MAP MATERIEL FUNDING FOR BOLIVIA WAS TERMINATED AT END FY77; HOWEVER, MATERIEL FINANCED THROUGH THIS PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE DELIVERED THROUGH FY 1980. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT TO ADMINISTER BOTH MAP AND FMS PROGRAMS AMPLIFIES THE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD OF IN-COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL.

B. THE CONTINUED RECEIPT OF MAP MATERIEL FOR THE TIPO REGIMENTS AND FOLLOW ON EQUIPMENT FOR THE SIGNAL BATTALION AND MAINTENANCE
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UNITS HAS GENERATED REQUESTS AIMED AT PROVIDING THE BOLIVIANS THE TRAINING AND EXPERTISE NECESSARY TO SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY THE EQUIPMENT. THE ABSENCE OF THE WIDE RANGE OF SPECIALISTS WHICH WERE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO THE FY 78 MILGP REDUCTION HAS NECESSITATED A GREATER RELIANCE ON MTT'S TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT. THIS CONDITION, WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF INCREASING WORKLOAD, WILL CONTINUE IN FY 80.

C. THE LANDLOCKED POSITION OF BOLIVIA CREATES AN UNUSUAL AND INCREASED SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD IN THAT SURFACE SHIPMENTS (THE BULK OF DEFENSE MATERIEL TO BOLIVIA IS SHIPPED BY THIS MODE) MUST BE ACCEPTED AND TRANSLOADED AT A PERUVIAN PORT (ATARANI). EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT MILGP MEMBER PHYSICALLY BE ON HAND TO ACCEPT WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AT THE POST.

D. CURRENT LEVEL

A. SIX US MILITARY:

(1) COMUSMILGP/SENIOR ARMY REP (ARMY O-6): INCUMBENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND DIRECTING THE OVERALL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN-COUNTRY. HE IS CONTINUALLY REQUIRED TO EFFECT COORDINATION WITH MOD, COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, GENERAL/FLAG OFFICERS, AND SENIOR COLONELS OF HC. HE IS

MILGP/ODC REPRESENTATIVE TO THE COUNTRY TEAM AND IS AMBASSADOR'S PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISOR IN OTHER THAN ATTACHE MATTERS.

(NOTE: THE WORK LOAD ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABOVE DUTIES PRECLUDES INCUMBENT ACCOMPLISHING THE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED FOR THE ARMY LOGISTICS OFFICER DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARA.)

(2) LOGISTICS OFFICER (ARMY O-5): PLANS, PROGRAMS, COORDINATES, AND MANAGES THE EXECUTION OF MAP AND FMS PROGRAMS. THOUGH NEW MAP AID TO BOLIVIA HAS TERMINATED, RECEIPT OF MAP FUNDED MATERIEL WILL CONTINUE THROUGH FY 80. TRANSITION TO FMS AND FMS CREDITS BY THE BOLIVIAN ARMY WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE MANAGEMENT BY A HIGHLY QUALIFIED ARMY OFFICER FOR THE FORESEEABLE

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FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, INCUMBENT MANAGES ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARMY PORTION OF THE IMET PROGRAM.

(3) US ARMY LOGISTIC NCO/TRANSPORTATION SPECIALIST (ARMY E-7): WORKS UNDER SUPERVISION OF LOGISTICS OFFICER AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MAP/FMS SUPPLY TRANSACTIONS. PERFORMS DUTY AS CUSTOMS OFFICER FOR ALL MILITARY SHIPMENTS AND PROVIDES INTERFACE WITH BOLIVIAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS. DUTIES INCLUDE MONITORING STATUS OF ALL REQUISITIONS AND DELIVERIES AND SUBSEQUENT PREPARATION OF ALL REQUIRED REPORTS. INCUMBENT IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF MAP/FMS SHIPMENTS FROM PORT OF MATARANI, PERU TO LA PAZ, BOLIVIA.

(4) SENIOR NAVY REP/TRAINING OFFICER (NAVY O-5): SPECIALIZED SUPPORT OF THE BOLIVIAN NAVY'S LOGISTIC AND TRAINING NEEDS ARE CRITICAL AREAS. HOST COUNTRY IS PLACING GREATLY INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE EASTERN RIVERS. FURTHER, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BOLIVIAN NAVY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS GOB CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR AN ACCESS TO THE SEA. SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPRESENTATION TO ASSIST THIS SERVICE TO TRANSITION TO FMS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND TO MANAGE THEIR PROGRAM IS VITAL. IN ADDITION, INCUMBENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING ALL ASPECTS OF THE NAVY PORTION OF THE IMET PROGRAM.

(5) SENIOR AF REP PROGRAMS OFFICER AIR FORCE (O-5): THE OFFICER IN THIS POSITION IS A SPECIALIST IN AIR OPERATIONS WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN THE C-130. THE C-130 IS THE MOST EXPENSIVE BUY IN BAF HISTORY AND FOLLOW ON FMS SUPPLY SUPPORT IS ANTICIPATED. THIS POSITION WILL ALSO BE INVOLVED IN FMS SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THE BAF HELICOPTER FORCE AND FINAL TAIL-OFF OF PENDING BAF MAP EQUIPMENT. POSITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING BOTH IMET AND FMS BAF TRAINING PROGRAMS INCLUDING CZ AND CONUS TRAINING AS WELL AS MTT IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS.

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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(6) STAFF SUPPORT/PLANS OFFICER (AIR FORCE O-4): THIS OFFICER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE MILGP/ODC. HE OPERATES THE MILGP/ODC END OF THE SUPPLY-SUPPORT AGREEMENT WITH THIS EMBASSY. THE POSITION DEMANDS AN OFFICER WHO, BEYOND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY, IS QUALIFIED IN THE LOGISTICS FIELD AND HAS AN OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND TO AID THE ARMY LOGISTICS OFFICER ON TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND AID THE SENIOR AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE AS NECESSARY.

B. 2 US CIVILIANS

(1) ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISOR (GS 7-9): THIS PERSON MANAGES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE LEVEL WORK LOAD SERVING IN A POSITION TO POSITION A,(6) ABOVE AND SUPERVISORY TO POSITIONS B(2), C(1) AND C(2) BELOW. THE MAJOR WORKLOAD ITEMS IN THIS AREA ARE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, UNIT LOGISTICS, UNIT TRANSPORTATION/MAINTENANCE, PUBLICATIONS MAINTENANCE AND OTHER FUNCTIONS AS DIRECTED BY A,(6) ABOVE.

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(2) SEC/STENO (GS-5): THIS PERSON ACTS IN CONSONANCE WITH POSITION B(1) ABOVE TO COORDINATE ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOAD OF USMILGP, ACTS AS RECEPTIONIST FOR COMUSMILGP, ADMINISTERS UNIT PETTY CASH FUND AND OTHER FUNCTIONS AS DIRECTED BY A,(6) ABOVE THROUGH B, (1) ABOVE.

C. 5 LWR

(1) LWR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (TRANSPORTATION): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL RECORDS AND FILES DEALING WITH SHIPMENTS AND RECEIPTS ON MILAIR. WORKS IN CONSONANCE WITH MAC STATION MANAGER AND MAINTAINS LIAISON WITH LOCAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES AND MAC FOR SERVICE. ACTS AS QUALITY CONTROL CENTER FOR ALL USEMB/GSO, USAID, AND USICA MILAIR SHIPMENTS.

(2) LWR SECRETARY/STENO (ADMIN): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MILITARY ORDERS, FILING PROCEDURES, SPANNISH TRANSLATIONS, ETC., FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. FILLS IN FOR B(2) ABOVE IN ABSENCES (DAILY EMBASSY MAIL/MESSAGE RUNS, ETC.) IS LIAISON CENTER FOR ALL PASS/ID ACTION WITH HOST MILITARY.

(3) ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (TRAINING): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CORRESPONDENCE AND FILES MAINTENANCE CONCERNED WITH IMET PROGRAM, MILITARY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, AND NAVY MAP/FMS PROGRAMS. ADDITIONALLY ACTS AS SECRETARY/STENO FOR NAVY SECTION.

(4) ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (AFSEC TRAINING/TRANSLATOR): RESPONSIBLE TO CHAFSEC FOR DISPOSITION OF ALL AFSEC TRAINING FILES, ORDERS, STUDENT BRIEFING, ETC. IS OFFICIAL TRANSLATOR FOR ALL FORMAL USMILGP CORRESPONDENCE INCLUDING SOCIAL INVITATIONS/RESPONSES FOR COMUSMILGP. BECAUSE OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE, INDIVIDUAL OCCUPYING POSITION IS LIAISON IN ALL APPROPRIATE MATTERS IN WHICH MILGP MEMBERS AND FAMILIES NEED DOMESTIC/PERSONAL/OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT/CIVILIANS.

(5) ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (LOGISTICS): IS RESPONSIBLE TO CHAFSEC FOR TYPING, FILING, DISPOSITION, ETC., OF ALL USMILGP FMS/SECRET

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MAP CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS.

E. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD IS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROGRAM FUNDING LEVELS (I.E. A DECREASE OR INCREASE IN FUNDING LEVELS DOES NOT PERFORCE DEMAND SIMILAR CHANGES IN MANNING LEVELS). THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ACCOMPLISHED BY US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. AT ALL PROPOSED PROGRAM LEVELS, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, COORDINATING AND EXECUTION REMAIN CONSTANT. PIPELINE DELIVERIES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT TO OPERATE

MILGP AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE US MISSION HERE REMAIN CONSTANT. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLE IS THE NUMBER OF HC PERSONNEL TO ATTEND US MILITARY TRAINING. HENCE, THE US PERSONNEL STAFFING REQUIRED TO MANAGE THE PROGRAM AT THE "CURRENT" LEVEL IS APPLICABLE TO ALL OTHER LEVELS. HOWEVER, REDUCTIONS IN THE LWR MANNING LEVELS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AT THE INTERMEDIATE AND MINIMUM PROGRAM LEVELS.

14. ESTIMATED PROGRAM LEVELS FOR FY 1981 AND 82

MISSION CONCEPT FOR FY 81 AND 82 FUNDING LEVELS ENVISIONS
MAINTAINING IMET AT THE INCREMENTAL REAL LEVEL (I.E., THE
INCREMENTAL LEVEL ADJUSTED UPWARD TEN PERCENT EACH YEAR TO
OFFSET INCREASE COURSE COSTS) WHILE ESTABLISHING FMS CREDITS
AT \$10,000,000.

	IMET	FMSCR
FY 1981	\$630,000	\$10,000,000
FY 1982	\$690,000	\$10,000,000

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